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Remarks
This copy received from Senator McClure.

Executive Secretary
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Executive Registry

85- 4106

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Prior to the Geneva Summit, the Secretary of Defense will present to you a series of options for enhancing your strategic modernization program. These options are now being prepared at your request in response (1), to systematic and continuing Soviet violations of SALT Treaties and 2) to the alarming growth of Soviet strategic forces as outlined in National Intelligence Estimate 11-3/8, the Central Intelligence Agency's most recent estimate of the Soviet Union's nuclear war-fighting capabilities.

We strongly urge that you continue to produce the B-l bomber beyond the 100 aircraft currently planned, and sustain such production until we are certain that the Stealth bomber can be built and deployed. This will signal American resolve and firmness; it will greatly bolster both nuclear and conventional deterrence, improving stability; and it will be cost effective because the B-l program has a proven record of sound financial management.

Currently, production is planned to be limited to less than half the number originally requested by the Air Force. As such, the last B-l will be built in mid 1988. But the first of the 130 planned Stealth bombers cannot be delivered before 1991, a three year gap -- and that assumes that no Stealth problems will be encountered. This assumption has proven fallacious in many far less complex conventional weapons systems. Moreover, even a trouble-free Stealth program will result in far too few U.S. modern long-range bombers. Currently, there are already gaps of several years between the ALCM B and the Advanced Cruise missile, and between the Trident I and II SLBMs. The ALCM B and the Trident I were the only U.S. strategic nuclear weapons being produced for current deployment.

Mr. President, you can be proud of your decision to build the B-1, which is the most successful of your modernization initiatives. The B-1 continues to be built below cost and ahead of schedule. We believe that it will be able to penetrate Soviet



The President October 3, 1985 Page 2

defenses probably into the 21st century. In these times of tightening defense budgetary constraints, the B-1 is proof that the United States can set its sights on an ambitious defense project and achieve its goals on time and without cost over-runs.

If you keep B-l production alive until Stealth is able to come on line, the additional B-ls built will give America a larger force of truly modern aircraft at economical and cost effective rates of production. As a result, the United States will have practical alternatives at hand should unforseen problems arise with Stealth.

Most important, Mr. President, you will demonstrate convincingly to our allies and adversaries alike that the United States can respond rapidly in a firm yet unprovocative manner to those who would darken our world by threatening the prospects of freedom and liberty.

Sincerely,

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CC:

Director, CIA

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director, ACDA

Secretary of Defense

Secretary of State